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Abstract. This paper may be one of the first attempts dealing with the problem of creating,
providing and maintaining antifragility of systems of interdependent urban critical
infrastructures (CI) in the wake of black-swan type technological, ecological, economic or
social catastrophes occurring in a municipality. A synonym is offered to describe antifragility
from a positive psychology perspective, formulating the problem as the supraresilience
problem. A brief description is given of the developed innovative approach for creating a
supraresilient city/region using black-swan catastrophe and the antifragility concepts.
Resilience metrics are formulated as well as methods of assessing damage, interdependence of
infrastructures and convergent technologies and sciences needed for practical regional
resilience and risk management of the system of systems (SoS) of interdependent urban critical
infrastructures).

1. Introduction
The black swan and antifragility concepts and their mostly phenomenological theories and empirics
introduced to the broad public by Nassim Nicolas Taleb (N.N.T.) [1,2] are based on in-depth and
convincing analysis of modern finances and macroeconomics, seamlessly coupled with the wisdom of
a plethora of Ancient and modern philosophers and leavened by anecdotal and apocryphal cases,
mostly from the Levant, Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome and other Near Mediterranean countries.
These concepts are based on three whales: (1) profound nonlinearity of mysterious unknown
random processes of time and financial transactions that rule the financial world of NYSE, NASDAQ
and the like; (2) extremely rare events that now and then shock World macroeconomics, create and
bring super expensive chaos into lives of millions if not billions of people; (3) ability to see and use
the intrinsic asymmetry of the optionality principle to one’s (non-sucker, in NNT’s parlance) benefit.
However, their generalization onto other sectors of human activity, science and engineering
(practically, to all walks of life, as energetically offered by N.N. Taleb in [2]), need some serious
bricolage (adjusting, calibration, tinkering), for we all know: the devil is in the details. For potential
users considered in this paper (urban decision makers DMs), without specific tinkering this approach
may turn out to be counterproductive or an overkill.
Content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence. Any further distribution
of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
Published under licence by IOP Publishing Ltd
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2. The Black Swan catastrophe (BSC) concept
According to N.N. Taleb, the black swan catastrophe (BSC) is an event with following attributes: (1)
it lies outside the realm of regular expectations (is a huge surprise not only to broad public, but also to
the very specialists who designed the system in consideration; in our case, any urban critical
infrastructure); (2) it results in (relatively) massive, catastrophic losses; (3) despite being an outlier,
risk analysis specialists every time explain the next BSC occurrence post factum, making it look as an
explainable and predictable event (although actually, it is unpredictable).Originally this kind of
unpredictability was attributed by N. Taleb exclusively to macroeconomic and financial events. Later,
this concept was applied with mixed results by other authors to some other sectors of technology and
sciences [3,4].
It should be noted that the BSC as an event is scalable and is intrinsically conditional. One could
imagine a BSC of global dimension (say, the unexpected and unpredictable Krakatau earthquake,
Indonesia, 1897; global financial catastrophes of 1929 or 2008), as well as regional, local and down to
personal scale BSC, when a stakeholder or pensioner loses her savings/assets in a surprise (for her)
bankruptcy of a company. These conditions could be unknown to (1) the world scientific community;
(2) a group of people who were affected by the BSC; (3) a single person due to lack of needed
knowledge and/or false perception of the BSC before it happened.
Taleb further gives a classification of the super-rare events: he recognizes black-, grey- and whiteswan (benibn rare) events, claiming that he deals only with black swans in macroeconomics and
finance. In this context we will consider two types of BS events: in economics, which we will denote
as BSEe, and in Mother Nature or second, man-made Nature, which will be denoted as BSEph.
The grey-swan events in the field of economics were taken care of by the famous mathematician,
Benoit Mandelbrot, when he introduced his fractal theory [5] and showed that many events
(distribution of wealth, revenue from selling books of different authors, etc.) obey not the exponentbased Gaussian probability distribution function (PDF), but the more complex power PDFs with socalled fat tails. N.Taleb remarked [1] that due to B. Mandelbrot, who was first to use a more accurate
and consistent in macroeconomics PDF (namely, the Pareto PDF, that possesses a fat [or heavy] tail),
to describe BSEe, the latter were transformed into grey swan events, as they started to be to some
extent more predictable. Here it would be appropriate to recollect the famous adage: The tail wags the
dog.
The white black-swan events are benign, because they produce (very rarely) great benefits, not
losses.
Engineers and scientists from the oil and gas industry produced [4,6,7] their own classification of
black- swan type events. They recognize following industrial BSEph: (1) completely unknown to the
scientiﬁc/engineering community (unknown unknowns up to the moment of their occurrence); (2)
unknown to the specific /local scientiﬁc/engineering community, but known if considered worldwide
(unknown knowns – unknown events to some (suckers), known to others (non-suckers)); (3) well
known, but considered extremely unlikely to happen during the entire lifetime or the timeframe
between consecutive inspections or maintenance of the designed structure/system (say, a main pipeline
or a sea-shelf platform). The tsunami that destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station is a
typical example: in that region of Japan there were previously observed (in the 6-th and 13-th century)
more severe tsunami, but the probability of them reoccurring was so minuscule (once in a million
years), that it was deliberately ignored. If the unfortunate nuclear power plant had been built just
several meters higher above ground, or had a levee built around it, the critical pumps wouldn’t been
flooded and there would be no Fukushima catastrophe, and no belated surprise that it happened.
Other BSCph are of the perfect-storm type (when all the components of such an event are well
understood, but the probability of them emerging simultaneously, creating a negative synergy effect is
so miniscule that it is deliberately ignored [8]), like the Guadalajara hail storm (in July 2019) when
some parts of this city, according to the Washington Post, were covered by a five feet high layer of
hail; or the 2019 flooding of New Orleans when a storm wave, wind-induced wave and the Mississippi
flow created a synergistically combined wall of water that drowned the city.

2

SPCECI 2019
IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Materials Science and Engineering 972 (2020) 012001 doi:10.1088/1757-899X/972/1/012001

There are attempts to make more reliable predictions of industrial and natural catastrophes using
some combinations of brainstorming and computer modeling [9–13]. The forecasters now claim that
some weak signals could serve as early heralds or precursors of BSEph, although the time to it will still
be an unknown. Some clues from global warming, cosmic events or animal behavior can be
effectively used for this matter.
In physics and engineering sciences statistical analysis of rare events is performed, using such
PDFs, as Freshet, Gumbel, and Weibull, to name a few. Using the Bayes methodology these PDFs can
be continuously updated after each occurrence of a rare event. This permits meaningful assessment of
probabilities of stronger accidents and catastrophes in the above-mentioned fields
BS events that take place in modern physics, industry and all types of engineering (BSEph) do not
have the devastating effect that is demonstrated by BS events in macroeconomics and finances (BSEe).
The reason for this is that the forces that play out during an industrial disaster are limited by location,
physical laws, size of the installation, and the reached level of sophistication of the technology in
containing energy, the only exclusion being nuclear energy and nuclear war. Natural catastrophes can
be more violent than any human folly, but they also erupt locally, are contained by the size of planet’s
continents/oceans and laws of mechanics and physics. Damages from BSEph always have natural
physical limits that could be reasonably assessed. Even in a potential Armageddon-type catastrophe
involving the whole Universe we have a number, called googol, that cannot be exceeded. Bottom line:
All engineering accidents are much less grey than Mandelbrot’s grey-swan catastrophes.
Some BSEe that happen in finances and macroeconomics, on the contrary, deliver a global blow to
virtually every country, alongside with millions of stockholders. BSEe are not contained by the actual
combined cost of the world’s physical and intellectual assets. The combined value of stocks (financial
instruments) traded on all the major stock exchanges (in New York, London, Tokyo, Berlin, Shanghai,
Moscow, etc.) is several times larger than the combined value of the physical assets that they
represent. The BSEe defy prediction explicitly because despite availability and accessibility of all the
enormous amount of financial and economic data, generated every second, statistically it is not
homogeneous. It consists of “real” data (reflects the physical assets, and “virtual” data (reflects the
speculative component and human perception of what the stock may be priced in the future), without
any means to parse it into real and virtual. That parsing the data into homogeneous sets is impossible
is reflected in the famous mantra: «All costs are already accounted for in the current price of stock».
There are, obviously, many other reasons for the financial market to be a classical black box, but their
consideration is beyond the scope of this paper.
Modern economic and technical systems as they become more complex and interdependent are
becoming more vulnerable in respect to accidents and catastrophes. The consequences of industrial
catastrophes continuously grow with time due to the negative synergy of damaging effects
(leak/rupture + fire + blast + destruction of assets + pollution of air/soil/water + loss of life-days, limbs
and life + loss of revenue, trust, reputation and prestige). Many BSEph became transboundary,
international. Industrial and natural catastrophes are becoming a serious destabilizing factor that
prevents sustainable development of cities, regions and countries.
The rate of occurrence of industrial accidents is still high despite all the efforts to pull it down.
According to [14] in 90% of automobile accidents the culprit is the driver(s); in aviation and river
transportation up to 83% of catastrophes have human factor HF as the root cause; the same holds true
in the energy field – 80% of industrial accidents are due to mistakes of the field personnel; in sea
catastrophes 75% of them are related to human mistakes and mishaps; in railway transportation the
corresponding number is 50%. According to [15], the HF in technogenic catastrophes frequently
comes down to such human traits as stupidity, neglect or greed. All in all, it can be stated that the
weakest link in the industrial safety problem is the human factor. Similar numbers apply to accidents
in interdependent urban critical infrastructures. Hence, in order to drive down the probability of BSEph
we should turn our attention to the role of HF in their occurrence.
What can be put against this tendency? Foremost, teaching safety culture to all employees of all
ranks. And creating an atmosphere that stimulates active search of vulnerable points of the
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infrastructure being maintained. In this context, the popular motto in the 1980s of a giant American
corporation: To err is human. To forgive is not company policy, spread worldwide (author came across
it while lecturing at Milan Politec) as a cartoon in which a designer standing in front of a drawing
board is beaten with a stick from behind, today would not be well received by employees or by the
broad public. Instead of punishing, a tolerant climate is needed, where everybody freely
communicates, and upper echelon of listens to the lower. Forming safety culture is the universal tool
for not allowing wrong actions of personnel that lead to mishaps and accidents.
Industrial catastrophes are developing in a continuously deteriorating man-made environment. The
health of deteriorating structures and machines is periodically or continuously diagnosed and
monitored, providing operators and owners of the assets with robust data using which sound
assessment of their residual life can be obtained. This permits controlling the operated system in time,
using risk based predictive maintenance methods.
3. The fragility-antifragility concept
N.N. Taleb justly and correctly describes the fragility-antifragility concept as a specific current
property of any object, tacitly indicating that antifragility is an explicit function of time. Fragility is a
well-known property in structural mechanics, that defines low ability of an object to resist external
and/or internal harmful factors. In English language there exists a near-synonym of this word:
brittleness, that has a more negative connotation than fragility (e.g., brittle diabetic, but a mentally
fragile old relative). Its antonym is ductility or viscosity. Some strong viscous metals like steel alloys
and structures made from them become brittle when exposed to very low temperatures (below minus
50 degrees Celsius). This phenomenon brings to life the urgent design problem of creating coldclimate-resistant pipelines, transportation and ground moving machinery for the Far North, Arctic and
Antarctica regions.
In Russian language the word resilience – живучесть – refers both to live and dead (nonanimated) objects and means that a system is able not only to rebound after being released from a
stressor, but also continue to exist (stay alive/operate) when being injured/damaged and perform its
functions under stressor or duress as designed by humans or God. According to the Ozhegov Russian
dictionary живучесть describes the ability of a system (say, a battleship), to stay afloat and continue
to fire, using its remaining internal strengths, while having its scull damaged by adversary’s artillery.
In this context the word непотопляемый (unsinkable) is also used in relation to boats and humans
alike. A perfect visualization of this notion can be seen in a Russian doll called ванька-встанька
which means the stand-up vanya, or неваляшка which can be translated as roly-poly (Fig. 1). Being
forced into a horizontal position and then released, it immediately pops up back into vertical position.
Hence the name of the doll.

Figure 1. The roly-poly doll that perfectly illustrates the classical
resilience concept.
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Antifragility, on the contrary, did not exist as a notion before Nicholas Taleb introduced it in 2012
as an antonym to fragility and demonstrates itself as the ability of a system to become stronger (up to
an unknown point) after experiencing a stressor. If the stressor exceeds this unknown level (which
itself is a random function of time), the person instead of accruing antifragility may become seriously
harmed and loses his initial capabilities. Hence, antifragility is principally more than resilience or
robustness. Taleb uses this connotation (antifragility) only in relation to live or complex objects –
human beings and the Mother Nature (biological and ecological systems). He also admits that complex
systems can be antifragile, obviously meaning, by default, that their complexity must include the
human dimension. Antifragility is a trait that exclusively exists in living objects, because mind-/spiritless (dead) objects have no ability to proactively react to different stressors of economic, financial or
emotional, as well as of physical nature so as to become more resilient/strong than before the stressors
were applied. Creative human action is essentially needed to achieve that part of antifragility that is
beyond resilience of non-animated objects as we know it.
All objects created by human beings cannot become stronger after being treated by a vector of
physical or chemical stressors (loads and/or influences),as they are intrinsically fragile, but this
statement may soon not be fully true. There is already one case related to a nano-tube carbon
composite material that became stronger after being physically stressed [16]. An ever-growing
amount of research is conducted addressing self-healing and resilience of critical infrastructures,
specifically power and information networks. In the literature that emerged after 2012, the antifragility
idea as a trendy topic started to be misused, being mechanistically applied to such inert (dead) manmade systems as architectural design and buildings [3]. In the latter case authors seem to confuse
moral longevity of buildings and cities (their capability to absorb technical innovations – growing
automobile and streetcar traffic, elevators, influx of population, etc. without change or becoming
extinct) – with antifragility. If I buy a pair of Levi’s jeans a couple sizes larger than my current waist
and then wear them until I feel them tight on me, I cannot claim that these jeans all the time were
antifragile. In order to be antifragile they must adjust by themselves, without human intervention, to
the size of my waist and self-repair, if need be.
Antifragility comes from and is revealed by mostly yet unknown inner forces of every human or
biological being (i.e., bear, turtle, sequoia tree, etc.) or their population (i.e., rats, bees, ants or human
communities) as reaction to different types of stressors. These forces are triggered by thirst for life,
freedom, pursuit of happiness, all kinds of extreme challenges, lust for power, sex, wealth, fear,
hunger, ultimate anger/fury, obsessive love, vanity, extreme circumstances (e.g., low/high ambient
temperature or pressure), words of encouragement, patriotism, faith and sense of duty, drugs, and so
on. In general, it is a manifestation of biological vitality which is, by itself, the force of life. Probably,
because of this, antifragility was always nameless and word-(expression)less, understood by default by
humans for millenniums as an intrinsic indelible component of vitality and, hence, never (before
Taleb) became a separate issue for a philosophical discourse.
It is not fully known what happens in the body, mind and spirit of an individual when she/he is
exposed to some specific stressor/ set of stressors. The outcome (positive or negative) of such event
may come down to overreaction/overshooting. This phenomenon is responsible for preparing a
biological system to become more powerful in the future in relation to the applied specific stressor
(load, poison, cold/hot ambient temperature, etc.), when the stressor will be stronger than the
experienced last time. It may be not a universal type of response of the system to stressors. In some of
the cases, hidden abilities of humans are revealed immediately, in the face of extreme danger, as in a
documented case when an Arctic pilot, wearing heavy arctic gear and being attacked by a polar bear,
saved his life jumping directly from the snow onto the plane’s wing (approximately two meters from
the snow surface) and getting into his cabin [17]. Schizophrenics during their bouts of wild insanity
accrue the ability to lift weights (throw heavy oak tables on nurses or lift the back of a taxi car to
prevent it from moving away), impossible to lift for them when in normal condition. A champion (of
the Warsaw Zoo) chimpanzee (average weight—60 kg), that does not have human conscience and
does not fully understand the environment and capabilities of his own body jerks from chest a 650 kg
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bell bar (nearly 11 times his own weight); on average, a Warsaw Zoo chimpanzee jerks 450 kg [17].
Currently the men’s world record in this heavy weight discipline (category up to 56 kg) is only 198 kg
(3.54 times the record holder’s weight). (This huge difference can be partially explained by that
chimpanzee’s arm muscles are wired differently from human arms muscles, although they are also
longer than ours. It seems that this is the price humans pay for having consciousness). Rats, when
being decimated by humans, using poison, traps and other lethal means, demonstrate an unusual
antifragility as a cohort. They start intensive breeding, and new-born rats reach puberty at the tender
age of two weeks, still being blind [17].
It should be noted that if the stressor is exceeding some ultimate level, the person exposed to such a
stressor produces such an overshooting that makes him not stronger, but weaker/sicker, and she/he
falls into the subset of fragile components of the system, becoming not a system’s asset but its
burden/liability. The type of PDF that governs the antifragility skills is a mystery (known unknown),
but one could speculate that physical antifragility is closer to the Gaussian distribution rather than to
the Pareto type distribution: genius is always a very rare commodity. The distribution of cognitive
antifragility skills, though, probably could be better described by the Pareto type PDFs. In any case,
when creating a smart city, some empirical data on antifragility has to be used as a guidance for
selecting the city resilience team.
With the advent of global digitization, AI and robotization, some forecasters predict that by 2060
AI will match human intelligence [18]. The current level of computer science and AI already permits
adding some elements of (quasi-) antifragility to cloud computing [19] and creating emotional robots,
that are able, at least partially, to have a semblance of human emotions (quasi-emotions) and, hence, to
some extent understand human psyche. It seems that with the advent of time some 21-st century
robotic systems may be able to maintain and repair themselves to continue to operate «as new» or «as
before the stressor was applied» (this is resilience in its classical meaning [20]), and if need be, to
reconstruct themselves to become more smart and durable (for instance, during an unmanned
expedition on the Moon or Mars), by adding to themselves new modules with new functionalities and
higher resistance to unforeseen stressors. This would be an act of what could be called resilience plus,
ultra-resilience, uber resilience or, best, supraresilience (in Taleb’s parlance, antifragility), realized
by a man-made system without direct human intervention.
According to Collins English Dictionary the word supra comes from Latin and when used as a
prefix, means above, over, on top of, greater than, beyond the limits of, outside of. Obviously, it
perfectly matches the word resilience to describe the result of overshooting/ overcompensating. Hence,
supraresilience is a positive thinking absolute synonym of antifragility; therefore, both terms are
interchangeable and from now on will be used as such. In addition, the term supraresilience, in
general seems to be more fit for the physical and especially, engineering world, where the term
resilience is very well established and currently is a hot topic of research.
In order to achieve the described above feat, the supraresilient robot must be equipped with a smart
control subsystem that includes diagnostics, monitoring, maintenance, repair modules and a module
that is able to upgrade the capability of the robot (a self-upgrading module). This subsystem, driven by
IT and an AI «brain» brings the needed (quasi-) human dimension into the AI robot to achieve the
needed supraresilience/antifragility, as it can, using a two- or three level maintenance/control policy
[21], mitigate the damage due to a black/gray swan event and raise the robot performance to a level
higher than that of the initial design.
In many branches of modern industry (military, nuclear power, automotive, oil and gas, aviation
and the like) there are already unmanned robotized and flexible production lines equipped with these
types of modules. They have in place subsystems that autonomously and automatically carry out
diagnostics, monitoring and, to some extent, maintenance. For instance, according to data that can be
found in the Internet, the performance of the entire fleet of F35 airplanes is tracked by a software
system that provides holistic life support of each detail and aggregate of every airplane of the fleet.
The same source forms that the European Airbus company is in the process of equipping all
airplanes of its fleet with an array of sensors on every aggregate, overhead baggage bin and each
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passenger chair that generate in real time gigabytes of data related to the airplane performance and the
feedback of its passengers and flight attendants. This Big Data is streamed to the cloud and the onground servers and immediately analyzed, using the Airbus digital analytical platform Skywise, which
will also be fed by data from repair shops, spare parts suppliers, airports and airlines.
Using Skywise, by 2023 each Airbus plane will have its own digital twin. While the
carbon/titanium airplane will fly, its quasi-identical digital twin will do the same, but in virtual space.
The discrepancies between the current state of the real airplane and the state of its digital ideal copy
will be analyzed for detecting early predictors of possible future malfunctions or accidents. This
platform opens new perspectives in flight safety, flight traffic control and optimization. This
philosophy is also used by Airbus to create a passenger multicopter (flying taxi) for the city mobility
project Vahana.
One doesn't need to be a prophet to predict that all the above achievements will be sooner than later
emulated and adopted by modern smart cities of all sizes.
According to N. Taleb, antifragility is implemented by using its main tools: choice and option.
Freedom of choice permits choosing something that leads to more benefits than losses, while option =
asymmetry (specific non-linearity) + rationality, could be a substitute of knowledge (in everyday life).
N. Taleb doesn't describe how to diagnose, measure, and control the antifragility property in humans
during their lifetime. It is obvious though that in a community or society antifragility is spread
according to some Weibull type PDF that is a function of time. It also should be specific to each type
of antifragility (physical, cognitive social). Each person, no matter of what antifragility level, must
learn how to recognize the options and the asymmetries around her/him and at the workplace and how
to make sound decisions in the chaotic environment of the 21st century, keeping in mind that there are
no free lunches. In the areas of physical and engineering environment though, specialists have many
tools to describe in quantitative terms the options and the asymmetries as well as the tools that help
making right and sound decisions. At this point we stop further considering this topic as it is beyond
the scope of this paper.
4. Resilience of urban critical infrastructures: current concept
Some 10–15 years ago city managers around the world realized that industrial diagnostics, monitoring
and maintaining systems could be relatively easily adapted and used to optimally run and maintain all
city production, transportation and life support facilities. At the beginning, they were slow in
implementing these ideas but now, with the advent of digitization and AI, have accelerated their
efforts to transform their cities – large and small – into smart cities.
In the above context the concept of resilience emerged currently as a central theme of industrial and
urban development (there are more than 120 definitions of resilience, most of them are
qualitative) Sustainable cities of the 21-st century must first be safe, resilient, and, consequently,
smart in order to then become sustainable. For cities to be safe and smart they have to be resilient in
the first place [22]. In general, factors that influence city resilience include: the range and severity of
hazards; the risk to life, limb, health and property; the vulnerability and exposure of human, social,
and environmental systems to different types of hazards, and the degree of (strategic) preparedness of
the physical, social and the governance systems to any natural, urban or industrial shocks and stressors
and their consequences during an incident, accident, malicious act, or catastrophe.
The architecture of the urban resilience system (URS) [23] mimics the long time existing different
monitoring and maintenance optimization systems designed to enhance performance of critical
industrial infrastructures. The difference is in that the urban infrastructure, in its entirety, is a very
specific complex system of interdependent systems (SoIS), being widely spread over the whole
territory of a municipality, being 1) intensely used by the city community and 2) elements of its
transportation infrastructures (cars, trams, buses, metro carriages) continuously move. The URS is
designed to provide, in the first place, raw and processed data about how this SoIS functions and
degrades in time.
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System resilience consists of following components: 1) Structural resilience (reliability, probability
of failure); 2) Structural safety (risk level, damage zones, all types of losses); 3) Physical restoration
subsystem for renewing a damaged system. This subsystem can vary by means of recovery (e.g.,
democratic or authoritarian), time and cost of restoration, amount of materiel, financial and human
resources necessary for restoration; 4) Psychological restoration subsystem for the stressed-out
society. This subsystem also varies by the amount of psychological assistance and the duration of its
provision, as well as by the required human, materiel and financial resources.
Structural resilience is the ability of a system to maintain its functionality after being stressed by
loads greater than their design values or after a specific damage. Critical infrastructure has many
functions; therefore, CI has both complex (integral) and partial resiliencies. Both full and partial
resiliencies are always conditional. Since the properties of CI and the stressors that it experiences are
random, the resilience is also random and can be measured as the probability that the CI will retain its
function(s) under any specific random effect that is beyond the design parameters. The term
robustness is strongly related to the term resilience, as it means that the system is stable – it gives a
weak response to a strong disturbance.
The strategic readiness of a CI is such a state of the system when it remains reliable, relatively safe
and efficient to perform its main design functions, even with sudden application of extraordinary, way
out-of-design values of external influences. This can be achieved only by including into the CI a
deeply echeloned protection subsystem. A case of a one-dimensional stochastic model of failure and
recovery of infrastructure as a system is shown in Fig. 2.
Design
Capacity

f(r)

f(i)

Output (Q)

f(f)
Performance
without
maintenance and
and failure

0

ti tf

tr

Time

Figure 2. One-dimensional stochastic model of failure and recovery of infrastructure as
a system: ti – time to incident; tf – time to system failure; tr – time to recovery; f(i) – PDF
of the initial triggering event duration; f(d) – PDF of damage volume due to system
failure; f(r) – PDF of recovery quality.
According to the Rockefeller Foundation: «Urban Resilience is the capacity of individuals,
communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter
what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience, and even transform when conditions
require it.»
Resilient systems refer to those institutions, cities or states that have the ability to reconstruct and
to recover, using the right tools, assets and human social and cognitive skills to deal with impacts and
resist, absorb and adapt. The challenge here is how to manage these risks effectively, and how to
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transform a generic resilience concept into a tailored resilience of a specific infrastructure or a
system.The European Commission defines urban resilience (in general) as «the ability of … a
community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks
such as drought, violence, conflict or natural disaster».
The author's resilience concept adopts a multiple-hazards approach, considering resilience against
all types of plausible hazards, and refers not only to reducing risks and damages from disasters [i.e.
loss of lives, limbs, health, elements of Mother Nature (flora & fauna) and assets; i.e., components of
the second, man-made Nature], but also to the quantified ability to quickly recover to the pre-event
physical and psychological state after a disaster or catastrophe at as minimal as possible cost.
To assess the conditional regional resilience (and strategic preparedness) in relation to a
hypothetical catastrophe or accident that occurred within the ICI system under consideration, it is first
necessary to identify the region whose infrastructure has been damaged. For instance, to estimate the
regional resilience in the case of an impact/stressor (hurricane, deliberate actions of intruders, etc.) on
a large municipality (which includes industrial and civil buildings and structures that produce
commercial products and life support services for the population living in it), following initial data is
needed:
• GIS with a database (DB) on the topography, population density (number, gender, age,
profession), locations of damaged critical assets and installations, roads, waterways, etc., and
how they are interconnected, including information about their owners;
• Type of threats / stressors under consideration (earthquake, flood, technological disaster,
resulting in deaths, loss of limb, injuries, pollution of air, water bodies, landscapes, etc.);
• A stochastic description of the considered regional threat (impact);
• The design of the infrastructure in question, including types and number of various structures,
buildings and installations that make up the infrastructure and the type of their
interdependence (physical, informational) that determine the robustness and innate resilience
of each structure and the infrastructure as a whole;
• Statistical characteristics of the physical components of these ICI;
• The volume and form of available resources for mitigating and eliminating the consequences
of the disaster (finances, labor, materiel, transport, road-building machines, food, etc.) of the
region itself and additionally attracted from outside;
• The socio-demographic description of the society living in the territory occupied by the ICI.
Having the listed above initial data, it is necessary to:
• give a description of the primary failure of a system element that initiated the catastrophe per
se;
• define the areas affected by the incident (destruction zones) and assess the social risk and
materiel and human losses from the accident, with accounting for the possible cascade
development of the catastrophe;
• define the vulnerability / fragility curves (VC/FC) of each CI that got into destruction zone.
These FC establish the dependence of the conditional probability of a specified damage of a
structure on the magnitude of the received impact. Generalized FC are obtained by integrating
specific FC over the entire areas of possible external influences, and the physical properties of
the structures and infrastructures’ materials. FC, in combination with the results of the
analysis of the volume and nature of real damage to structures from one or another type of
impact (i.e., earthquakes, hurricanes, technological explosions, etc.) allow (via appropriate
calibration) accurate enough assessment of the number of damaged structures and the level of
destruction of each individual asset. These problems are solved using statistical dynamics
methods.
• Determine the likelihood that the described above region, subjected to a stressor, will recover
(from the damage level determined at the previous stage) to the level «as it was before the
accident» within the given directive period of time, using a specific amount of allocated
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recovery funds. This stage problems are solved using the statistical operations research
methodology.
• Evaluate the time and volume of necessary material and non-material means for bringing the
society back to the previous, pre-emergency level of the psychological state of security and
well-being, knowing the volume and composition of the destruction of critical infrastructures
and human losses.
To solve the above problems following tools are used:
• The «bottom-up» model of regional economic recovery [22,23];
• A full group of events, including all conceivable scenarios with the cascading development of
a natural or man-made disaster (involving people whose cognition skills include rich
imagination to construct such scenarios);
• A rational (quasi-optimal) plan for responding to an accident and rebuilding a damaged
facility, based on considering an as full as possible set of scenarios, including accidents with
minimal and maximum consequences.
The above approach allows minimizing the consequences of an accident by optimizing: the
distribution of food and water among victims of a disaster; the sequence of repair of electrical
networks, gas, water, sewage, etc.; localization, retention and collection of oil spills; road cleaning;
maintenance of shelters; distribution of sandbags for the construction of dams, etc. Direct and inverse
problems of restoring damaged critical infrastructures of the region also become solvable. The direct
task gives an assessment of the funds needed to restore the regional infrastructure given the amount of
damage and the preset recovery time; the inverse problem determines the necessary time for the
restoration of regional infrastructure with known volumes of losses and the allocated financial and
material resources (see [22,23]). These problems are solved iteratively using the Gantt and similar type
networks.
All the above allows for the effective management of regional ICI and of the society related to
these ICI, at normal times and times of various crises. Decision makers (DMs) at the level of
municipalities and territories receive an instrument of support and substantiation of their decisions. It
is no secret that due to lack of time and the lack of flexible tools, many decisions are often taken on a
hunch, especially when it is necessary to consider the long-term consequences of decisions. Using the
above approach, DMs will be able to track how taken decisions affect the quality of life and the level
of satisfaction of their wards / voters.
A typical development cycle of a single accident of a complex infrastructure in time consists of
three stages: (1) normal functioning and systematic preparation during its maintenance for the
prevention of potential disasters ( 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 ) ; (2) failure of any component that initiates damage to the
infrastructure and the development (most often, cascade) of a system accident ( t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 ) , and (3) its
recovery to the pre-emergency state or better than (manifestation of supraresilience /anti-fragility)

( t1 ≤ t ≤ te ) .

Each of the stages reflects, respectively, the ability of the system: (1) to resist the force impact
(manifestation of the congenital structural resilience), (2) to absorb the initial damage (by controlling
the stressed and deformed state of the system by: duplicating some of its functions, redundancy of
multi-component systems, changing the design scheme, dampers, vibration dampers, arrestors of crack
growth, etc.), and (3) recovering to the states «as before the accident», «as new», or «much better than
new», depending on the plan for using the system in the future and the degree of anti-fragility of the
creative DMs who own and / or manage the infrastructure in question. Thus, the system resilience is
determined by its ability: (1) to resist mechanical forces, kinematic and degradation effects (the local
failure initiating accident is characterized by an insignificant level of damage to the system); (2) to
absorb the impact of the initial damage and minimize the cascading/chain failure length and its
consequences. This quality is called robustness; and (3) to recover (quickly and efficiently regenerate
all its design functional properties).
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Strictly speaking, the ability to recover should not be considered an attribute of the infrastructure
per se (although it is accepted in practically all publications on systems resilience), since restoration of
the damaged or destroyed infrastructure is carried out by another (construction) infrastructure, while a
third (financial) infrastructure serves as a source of funds for restoration. The ability to recover should
be obviously attributed to the construction and financial branches of an enterprise that is the owner of
the damaged infrastructure, or mainly to the construction entity that performed the task of recovery, if
it was outsourced. It is also a function of the asset management ingenuity and quality, and of regional
governance specifics. Hence, system resilience Res Σ consists of two parts. One of them (Resstr) is the
resilience of the physical system per se, the other, Resrec, is the resilience of another infrastructure,
namely the one that conducts or governs the recovery of the damaged system:
Res Σ = Resstr + Res rec .

(1)

Likewise, the psychological supra-resilience also does not belong to the damaged system, because
this restoration is conducted by a fourth, medical infrastructure, although in many cases it is embedded
as a matryoshka (nested doll) in the system being recovered.
5. Supra-resilience of urban critical infrastructures
As an intrinsic property of any socio-technological system that explicitly includes human society
which consists of humans that are capable to adapt and make decisions based on to some extent free
choice as its integral part, supraresilience can serve as the basis and tool for solving the most urgent
issues of modern civilization. In order to describe antifragility from a mathematical point of view as a
logical extension of something that we already know how to describe (this is the most often used
mathematical technique in such cases) we can write that antifragility, conditioned on stressor Q
Antifragility(Q) = Resilience(Q) + Overcompensation(Q),

(2)

Supraresilience(Q) = Resilience(Q) + Overshooting(Q),

(3)

or, fully equivalent
Where overcompensation (overshooting) is the ability of the system to improve its initial quality
parameters (whatever they may be) after being exposed to specific stressors Q (on the condition that
they do not exceed some usually unknown ultimate limits. If they do, it injures/breaks the system).
It is also possible to define antifragility and supraresilience as only overcompensation /
overshooting.
If we agree on this definition, then the definition of urban supra-resilience antifragility using the
above European Commission description of resilience formulates as
Urban supraresilience (antifragility) is «the ability of an urban/regional system of systems of
critical infrastructures to withstand, adapt, quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as drought,
violence, conflict, natural, technological or man-made disaster, and at the same time improve/increase
its initial vitality parameters.
It is interesting to note that in China, the only country on the world stage that survived for more
than 5000 years without interruption, since ancient times exists a famous adage, which is used as a
curse, not as a benign wish to one’s antagonist: 愿你生活在变革的时代 (Yuàn nǐ shēnghuó zài
biàngé de shídài). The English translation sounds as: May you live in the times of change. It seems that
the Chinese society never cared much about the hidden antifragility of change and aimed at Confucius
style Ordnung.
The antifragility phenomenon is unique for each person, and for that matter, community, or society,
as it largely depends on one’s genes or a pool of genes. Moreover, it is a random function/field of the
person’s age, level of physical and mental health, and the type, level and duration of the stressor
imposed on her/him. Hence, for each type of stressor each person reacts by one’s own antifragility
feedback (overshoot). In order to effectively utilize one’s antifragility it is necessary to know her/his
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boundary between the benign and the unhealthy levels of the stressor at any given time, which is a
daunting, impossible task. There are no recipes for estimating these boundaries. Mankind does not
know how to reconcile human ambitions and human possibilities, and there are no methods other than
debilitating to test the strength of people. This statement seems to be true when testing the physical
and mental abilities and the creative power of people, the latter being even more difficult, as it also
depends on the level of one’s education and cultural upbringing. This leaves us with pure empirics
when trying to assess the combined (integral) antifragility of an urban society working as a team to
create an supraresilient smart city while operating, using and maintaining a system of systems of
critical interdependent infrastructures.
The supraresilience is achieved only if there is some extra resource or a genuinely new design for
the damaged system that permits overshooting, thereby creating a system more resilient than before
the event. This is a manifest of the HF supra-resilience (creative persons) involved in the project. In
general, everything of the man-made Nature that survived time could be considered as antifragility of
the past generations accumulated and preserved in built structures and passed on to present and future
generations.
6. The source of urban supraresilience
N. Taleb recommends [2] using the antifragility bell bar method when trading stock and conducting
other types of stock exchange business, that makes the person smart.This is advice that should be
followed by all urban DMs when they make macro economic decisions involving stock exchange. In
cases related to engineering practices the regional DMs should follow recommended practices from
multiple engineering sciences and convergent technologies as related to the areas of their expertise,
activity and responsibility. For instance, using structural reliability and resilience methods, they
should: (1) Simulate different scenarios of catastrophes. Each scenario produces its own results (loss
of production, decrease of RDP, number of injuries, fatalities etc.) of the catastrophe and the resources
and time needed to bring the system back to the state «as new», or «as before the catastrophe»; (2)
Optimize predictive maintenance using the two-or three-level policy method created for optimizing
mechanical systems [21].
The ultimate difference between the problems solved by the considered methods is in that in the
sphere of engineering the losses due to a catastrophe never will be as large as in the stock exchange
practice. Engineering practice has a sophisticated system of checks and balances in the form of safety
design codes and regulations developed over the last 50+ years. The stock exchange business, for
obvious reasons, still lacks such tools or methods of their effective implementation.
In order to fully understand the concept of urban antifragility demonstrated as supraresilience, it is
necessary to consider the urban system of systems (SoS) of physical critical interdependent
infrastructures that includes the human community as a separate social infrastructure in itself, that runs
and uses the production/services of the SoS, and, simultaneously, lives in the space of these
infrastructures (the urbs and the civitas [3]). When solving this problem, one must consider the
interconnection of the Mother-Nature with the second, man-made Nature in an urban environment,
looking through an supra-resilient lens that is in the hands of the smart community that runs the show
in a city.
In the context of the main theme of the paper (BSC and antifragility) and taking into account its
limited size, the remaining space of the paper is spent to describing in highly condensed form
following aspects of urban/regional supraresilience: (1) resilience metrics; (2) methods for assessing
the volume of damage caused by a specific set of stresses; (3) analysis of interdependence of critical
infrastructures; (4) convergent technologies/science needed for conducting research on regional
resilience.
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7. Resilience metrics
To quantify resilience it is necessary to introduce some transparent, meaningful and simple metrics,
easy to calculate and use for all of its components. These metrics can be given in absolute and relative
values.
In structural mechanics and reliability design there are just a few quantitative metrics for resilience.
Most of them were developed for using in design and are simply ratios of some crucial informative
parameters of the design vs same parameters of a reference baseline. They are hard to use, because
some of the parameters have to be known at a very early stage of design, before there is any possibility
to assess them.
In [22] structural resilience was described as reliability of a performing structure when loaded by
stressors beyond their design values. At the very moment the load on the system exceeds its design
value, the structural resilience of the system is equal to its structural reliability and the reliability
curve seamlessly transforms into resilience curve. Actually, resilience is described as reliability of a
structure, when it is exposed to stresses caused by loads that are above their design values.
Resilience analysis proposed in [23,24] for systems allows assessing physical and relative
consequences of the collapse of the quality of functioning of the ICI due to an accident or catastrophe
It should be scaled on at least such parameters as: (1) decrease of the volume of goods and services
produced by ICI, (2) losses of real regional domestic product RDP, (3) number of lost life-days,
injuries, limbs and fatalities (irreversible losses). It demonstrates changes in partial resiliencies and the
extent of damage of the infrastructure over time for different probabilities of an incident / accident /
catastrophe.
The specificity of calculus of the partial resiliencies is in that while reliability, structural resilience
and safety belong to one class of problems, the physical restoration resilience is an entirely new
problem, which belongs mainly to governance, operation research and logistics. The latter problem is
characterized by the time to recovery and its cost. The author proposes using as a resilience parameter
for the recovery phase the ratio of the products
($recTrec) / ($conTcon),

(4)

where ($recTrec) is the product of the actual amount of money and time spent on the recovery of the
damaged system; ($conTcon) is the same, for the same object, but during its construction.
The connection of these two groups of usually independent problems is in that solutions of the first
group of problems provide the input to the second group of problems, which is a perfect example of
how the infranetics' methodology works (more on this below).
In this paper, following [23,24], resilience is conveniently represented as a dimensionless random
variable or function of time, as the ratio of the current resilience to the resilience embedded in the
system during its design and realized during its construction and commissioning. Such a dimensionless
relative resilience function (variable), by definition, cannot be greater than unity.
When repeating the accident-recovery cycle, the base resilience may already be different from that
in the first cycle. Note that for each type of impact or combination thereof, it is necessary to perform a
separate assessment of the system resilience with respect to the specific stressor. Only if the system
receives (from its supra-resilience/antifragility component) the supraresilience property during its
renovation/repair/recovery can it exceed unity. It can turn out to be an emergent property of the system
only if the human factor (HF) is explicitly introduced into its composition, namely, those DMs who
decide which recovery strategy to choose, to what level of productivity / efficiency and by what
(calendar) time to bring back the damaged infrastructure, based on the regional needs and specifics of
its governance.
The calculation of resilience as a regenerative ability of a system requires stochastic modeling of
emergency response and the process of restoring damaged infrastructure. Here, the baseline is
resilience, calculated using «standard» rules and techniques, allowing to put the system into operation
at the pre-set time.
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All the above reasoning was carried out regarding the generalized productivity of the system.
Exactly the same reasoning can be carried out for other types of partial resilience, such as: throughput,
volume and speed of providing various services, percentage of population covered by a specific
service, number of critical facilities available for use (e.g., housing, grocery stores, medical,
educational, cultural, etc. institutions), providing opportunities for private and individual economic
activity, etc. A set of partial resiliencies that covers all vital aspects of life of a regional society is
considered as full.
For calibrating the algorithm that models the object recovery process, statistics on past accidents
and recoveries should be used, whenever and wherever possible. This results in more accurate partial
resilience curves of real damaged objects.
8. Methods for assessing the volume of damage caused to an infrastructure by a specific set of
stressors
A quantitative assessment of system resilience due to its ability to adapt consists in assessing the
degree and nature of the destruction of the whole system by a fixed value of overload. This is done by
constructing the so-called fragility/sensibility curves FCs [25], which link the magnitude of the impact
on the system with the magnitude of its consequential damage in a probabilistic sense the generalized
probabilistic risk assessment (GPRA) methodology can be effectively used for the evaluation of
critical infrastructure performance risk. This approach started in the late 1970s as related to nuclear
power plants and earthquakes, and are now used worldwide in order to assess safety of different
existing or projected civil structures and power plants subjected to strong ground motions. It should be
emphasized that there are no limitations to use this approach for other type of stressors and other types
of infrastructures having in mind the possibility of a black swan event.
Fragility curves express the conditional probability of failure (CPoF) of a specific infrastructure or
its component for a given specific stressor size (wind, wave, snow load, earthquake motion, etc). The
bearing capacity of the structure is presumed to be known, via gathering statistical data or conducting
computer simulation. Currently it usually is modeled by a Log-Normal distribution [18], but it could
be also modeled by a Weibull PDF.
The key components of a GPRA study are (1) stressor hazard analysis, (1) fragility evaluation for
each component and substructure and, (1) system analysis and construction of logical fault tree model.
In their entirety, these three elements allow for the proper risk quantification of the installation
(evaluation of the PoF due to the full set of possible accident scenarios). A hazard analysis yields a
family of curves, each corresponding to a confidence level and thus accounting for uncertainty in the
estimation of the specific hazard. This PoF can be expressed by convoluting the hazard curve with the
fragility curve. The PoF conditioned on stressor level parameter b is given by the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of capacity B, yielding:
s
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(5)

where Φ(·) is the standard Gaussian CDF. Hence, the FC is entirely defined by median capacity Bm
and logarithmic standard deviation β.
The upgraded version of this formula accounts for two types of uncertainties by incorporating two
random variables εU and εR with median equal to one and respective log-standard deviations βU and βR
(βU characterizes uncertainty in the knowledge of the median value whereas βR refers to inherent
(epistemic) randomness about the median). In this context, random bearing capacity is expressed as
[25]:

B = ( Bmε U )ε R ,
and the CPoF as:
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 log(b / Bm ) + b u Ф −1 (Q) 
Pf′ b (b) = Ф 
,
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(7)

where Q = the level of confidence that the CPoF Pf′ b < Pf b . Equation (6) defines a family of curves,
each corresponding to a confidence level Q.
Considering the safety of an infrastructure composed of substructures and equipments (e.g., a
petrochemical or power plant), the PoF of the entire system is determined by means of fault trees using
simple logical structures of AND and OR in order to combine different events likely to result in global
failure.
9. Analysis of interdependence of critical infrastructures
Interdependency is the main hot-spot issue when considering performance of urban critical
infrastructures. Currently, there are following possible practical approaches to quantify this
interdependence: 1) Analysis of the interaction of CIs in the form of transport networks (see Fig. 3); 2)
Study of the interaction and interdependence of CIs using multiple regression theory; 3) Computer
simulation of interdependence involving stakeholders (including building a digital twin/ close relative
of the objects under study) based on the HAZUR-БИЖУР software [26].
The analytical models fit for this kind of research should allow finding in a comparatively simple
way and without big errors numerical values of all types of damage and how they change in time. One
of the most versatile models here would be the advanced transportation network model [27].
This practical synthetic model describes functioning of interdependent systems of critical
infrastructures (ISCI), each of which is represented in the form of a transportation/services network
comprised of nodes and directed links. Nodes typically represent physical infrastructure components
(the so-called assets, such as electrical power producing plants, oil, gas and water processing units and
installations, hospitals, industrial and office buildings, research and education centers, living quarters
and the like), which are directly involved in supplying the population and local industries with
different products or commodities, and services. The links of the network are modelling the flow
(product transportation) between the nodes and may present electrical power grids, main and
distribution gas and oil pipelines; water supply and sewage systems, as well as railways and highways,
etc. The model considers the conditions and specifics of supply, delivery, overhaul, and demand of
resources, such as electricity, hot and cold water, and removal of the industrial and human activity
waste [27].

Figure 3. Visualization of interdependence
of two CIs.
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The specificity of solving such problems is in finding the critical points or thresholds when there
appear changes in the normal (design) performance of interacting CIs (see Fig. 3). State (0–1)
represents normal operation/performance of both CIs. State (1–2) is a state when the performance of
both CIs is still normal, but the reserve of CI #/I capacity is severely depleted. State (2–3) means that
any remaining reserve of the CI# I is gone and, hence, the consumption of CI #J is compromised. State
(3–4) represents the case when the energy output of CI#I is zero, or close to zero, and the operation of
the whole CI# I is brought down. The generic equation that describes the above situations has the
form:
(8)
∑ Ε ( τ ) − ∑ Q ( τ ) ≥ ∆ , [ ∆= 0, ∆ , ∆ ,...∆ ; i= 1, 2,...M , 0 ≤ τ ≤ T ]
where ∑ Ε is the energy output of the CI #I, ∑ Q is the energy consumption of the CI# I output, N
i

i

i

1

2

N

i

is the number of performance change triggers, M is the number of nodes in the CI#I network, T is the
total duration of joint performance of considered ICIs.
The second approach (multiple regression) is theoretically attractive but very hard to implement,
since it needs a lot of reliable data gathered from real life cases. This data can be provided by the third
approach, but once it is realized, there is no need for the second approach per se; it could be used for
visualizing the results obtained by simulation. The main problem of implementing the third approach
is in how to quantify the interdependence of the multitude of critical infrastructures that perform in or
out of sync.
10. Designing the regional risk management /governance strategy using infranetics concepts
In order to create an optimal strategy of regional risk management a special tool is needed that would
allow using multi- and inter disciplinary approach and various methods from different fundamental,
applied and engineering sciences under one umbrella [29]. For this matter in this paper the new
convergent science- Infranetics- based on the MAICS-convergent technology (Digital Stochastic
Mechanics, Artificial Intelligence, Information Theory, Cognitive and Social Sciences) is used. The
name Infranetics comes from Infrastructures+Cybernetics. Infranetics was constructed for solving the
central problem of safe innovative development of a region/territory/municipality by creating a
methodology of harmonized regulation of regional risk, based on optimal management of systems of
interdependent critical infrastructures (ICI). A full description of the method can be found in [28,29].
In Fig. 4 the flow chart of constructing such strategy using the infranetics philosophy and tools is
presented.
It can be seen that creation of such strategy involves a heterogeneous set of initial data and
knowledge from multiple fundamental, applied, and engineering sciences. When solving this problem
for some regions of the Russian Federation, the author came across several surprise info-gaps (most of
them known unknowns) in macro-economics [30], demography [31], reliability theory of large
systems [32], to name a few, which needed immediate attention, as they were roadblocks preventing
reaching the assigned goal. It seems that in this case infranetics concept threw new insight into the
research problem; advanced research in several fundamental and applied disciplines; greatly enhanced
and expedited the research.
Accumulating results of this kind of interdisciplinary research permits understanding what methods
from what disciplines belong to infranetics. The results, obtained by the above scheme, made it
possible to effectively manage the SICI in different types of municipalities and territories (see [33–
37]).
Infranetics manifests itself as a cross-pollinating complex-sciences discipline. It permits accurateenough prognosis of the behavior of complex socio-technological and economic systems being
designed or already performing, in usual and/or catastrophic situations. Infranetics uses goal-oriented
approach according which a unified concept is formed that describes ways and means for solving the
problem in consideration. If properly developed, infranetics could become the crucial convergent
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technology and discipline for governing smart supraresilient municipalities and regions in the 21st
century [38].

Figure 4. Regional governance strategy via regional resilience and risk
management using infranetics principles and tools.
11. Conclusion
The resilience property is the ability of an infrastructure system to continue to perform its design
functions in conditions when it is partially damaged and/or deprived of supplies, and with employees
and population psychologically stressed. This circumstance is the unconditional and the sole basis for
creating a reliable and safe smart territory. The concepts of acceptable risks developed for managing
the technological, industrial and natural risks are quite compatible with BSEph.
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Without resilience, it is impossible to create a smart region/city capable of sustainable
development. Resilience is also necessary for achieving the long-term goals of strategic development
of any region, which include developing human capital, improving the quality of life and increasing
the competitiveness of the economy through the systematic introduction of services and innovative
solutions.
Supra-resilience/antifragility should be a property of every socio-technical system, but it is not a
given. All physical infrastructures are fragile, by definition. But if coupled with a supra-resilient
component (i.e., high quality human factor) the socio-technical system can obtain needed antifragility
traits.
For a socio-technical systems to be antifragile, its supra-resilient components should take care of
all the system's fragile components. The supraresilient components in their term have to care of each
other, using for that all methods that mankind developed to this day, including the «skin in the game»
concept [38]. A structure can be designed to last (i.e., possess physical and moral longevity), be
adaptable and accommodate new functions through intelligent design, construction, optimal
maintenance and effective governance by the cognitive and creative components of the region/city that
can face the unpredictable events.
The concept of supraresilience opens the door to meaningful exploration of quantitative
dependencies/correlations between physical resilience of a system of systems of ICIs and the
psychological/societal resilience of people who live inside and extensively use this system of ICIs in
the context of different types of communities – from megacities, to big, medium size and small towns,
to villages/settlements and tribal areas.
The effectiveness of the interaction of ICIs cannot be adequately described without direct
consideration of the human factor (HF). Which profile specialists are best to pull off and solve this
task? This question is open for discussion, but it seems that civil and environmental engineers,
structural mechanics specialists and designers are best fit to take lead when tackling this problem.
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